S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. v. Adjoto [2026]

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Introduction

Fifteen years of employment, a disputed dismissal, and a final judgment from the Court of Appeal that Shell simply wasn't allowed to keep fighting — this appeal never actually reached its own substance, because the Constitution had already closed the door before the Supreme Court could open it. The Supreme Court, unanimously, struck out the appeal.

Fact of the Case

The respondent worked as a supernumerary police officer with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited from September 1993 until October 2008, when his employment was terminated following an internal "orderly room trial" that found him guilty of insubordination, discreditable conduct, and disobedience to lawful orders.

The respondent challenged his dismissal before the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Lagos Judicial Division, seeking a declaration that it was null and void, reinstatement, and payment of arrears. His position was that the orderly room trial procedure — a process rooted in police disciplinary rules — should never have applied to him at all, since he was privately employed by Shell and not a member of the Nigerian Police Force in any formal sense.

Shell's position was the reverse: that the respondent was, properly understood, an employee of the Nigerian Police rather than the company, and that any consequences of his dismissal were therefore the Police's responsibility, not Shell's.

Summary of Proceedings at the National Industrial Court

The trial court sided with the respondent. It found that he was not a police officer before his engagement, that he had applied directly to Shell for the role, and that he had drawn his salary and benefits from Shell for roughly fifteen years before his disengagement. On that basis, the Nigerian Police had no authority to dismiss him from his employment with Shell, and judgment was entered in his favour.

Summary of Proceedings at the Court of Appeal

Shell appealed. At the hearing, the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the appeal itself. The Court of Appeal sustained that objection, holding that Shell's grievance did not fall within the categories of dispute that carry a right of appeal against a National Industrial Court decision — and the appeal went no further at that level.

Applicant's Case at the Supreme Court

Still dissatisfied, Shell pressed on to the Supreme Court. There, the respondent raised a fresh preliminary objection, this time challenging the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter at all — arguing that under section 243 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, a Court of Appeal decision on any matter arising from the National Industrial Court's civil jurisdiction is final, full stop.

Respondent's Case at the Supreme Court

The respondent's objection was narrow and constitutional in nature: since this dispute — a master-and-servant employment matter — arose squarely from the National Industrial Court's civil jurisdiction, section 243(4) meant the Court of Appeal's decision was final by design. On this reading, the Supreme Court simply had no jurisdiction to entertain any further appeal, regardless of how strong Shell's underlying arguments might otherwise be.

Resolution of the Question for Determination

The Supreme Court agreed entirely with the respondent's objection, and in doing so, laid out the constitutional architecture governing appeals from the National Industrial Court with some care. Section 243(2) permits an appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right only on questions of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution. Section 243(3) allows further categories of appeal only where an Act of the National Assembly specifically prescribes them, and even then, only with the Court of Appeal's leave. And section 243(4) provides, without qualification, that the Court of Appeal's decision on any appeal arising from the National Industrial Court's civil jurisdiction is final.

The Court read that finality provision as exactly what it says. It found nothing in the constitutional text or its underlying purpose suggesting any route was ever meant to exist from that provision onward to the Supreme Court — a civil dispute originating from the National Industrial Court simply has nowhere further to go once the Court of Appeal has ruled on it. No amount of skilful advocacy or judicial interpretation can expand that endpoint to include a further appeal, because the Constitution simply never provided for one. Since this dispute was a straightforward master-and-servant matter falling within the National Industrial Court's civil jurisdiction, any attempt to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision further had no constitutional footing to stand on and amounted to nothing more than misusing the court process.

The Court also addressed, more briefly, the underlying question of how a court should interpret plain constitutional language: where the words used are clear and unambiguous, they are to be given their natural, ordinary meaning — the golden rule of interpretation — without straining for alternative readings the text simply does not support.

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court held that section 243(4) of the Constitution makes the Court of Appeal's decision final in any civil appeal arising from the National Industrial Court's jurisdiction, leaving no room for a further appeal to the Supreme Court. The preliminary objection succeeded, and the appeal was struck out for want of jurisdiction, with costs awarded against the appellant.

Appeal struck out.

Key Takeaways

  • A Court of Appeal decision on a civil matter arising from the National Industrial Court's jurisdiction is final by constitutional design — there is generally no further appeal to the Supreme Court.
  • This finality applies regardless of how strong the underlying merits might be. A jurisdictional bar of this kind ends the case at the Court of Appeal stage, full stop.
  • Clear constitutional or statutory language gets its plain, ordinary meaning. Courts won't strain to read in an exception the text simply doesn't provide.
  • Knowing where your appellate road actually ends matters as much as the substance of your case. Pursuing a further appeal that's constitutionally barred wastes time, money, and client goodwill.

In Practice

For many labour clients — which is understandable, a loss at the court of appeal knowing fully well that the door to a further appeal to the Supreme court is permanently shut could be disappointing. It is important for counsel in labour litigations during pre-trial conferences and client briefings to manage well the expectations of their clients, before this kind of finality provision of the constitution becomes too costly a surprise at the very end of the process. Let the clients know from the onset the strength and weaknesses of their case and whether they genuinely stand a good chance at the court of appeal should they lose at the National Industrial Court.

Related Reading

This case belongs alongside other posts on this blog dealing with the limits of appellate jurisdiction and when a case genuinely cannot go any further:

This post is based on the Supreme Court's judgment and is intended for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. 

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