Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Sailesh Kumar Singh [2026]

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Introduction

Over 157,000 litres of suspected crude oil, a ship called Akshay, and a fifteen-year prison sentence — but no order forfeiting the vessel itself. The Federal Government wanted that fixed at the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, unanimously, dismissed the appeal.

Facts of the Case

The respondent, along with twelve others and further persons still at large, was charged before the Federal High Court with conspiracy to commit a felony — dealing in petroleum products — and with dealing without authority in 157,822 litres of petroleum product suspected to be crude oil.

At the end of trial, the court convicted the respondent and his co-accused on the conspiracy count, but discharged and acquitted them on the second count, dealing in petroleum products. The trial court found, as a fact, that the prosecution had failed to prove that any petroleum product actually originating from Nigeria was found on board the ship. The respondent was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment without an option of a fine on the conspiracy count — but the trial court made no order forfeiting the vessel itself to the Federal Government.

The respondent appealed his conspiracy conviction to the Court of Appeal. The Federal Government cross-appealed, challenging both the acquittal on the second count and the trial court's failure to order forfeiture of the vessel. The Court of Appeal dismissed the respondent's appeal, and also dismissed the Federal Government's cross-appeal — on the basis that it was bound by its own earlier decision in a related appeal, arising from the same trial judgment and the same evidence, involving one of the respondent's co-accused.

Still dissatisfied, the Federal Government appealed further to the Supreme Court against the dismissal of its cross-appeal. But in framing that final appeal, its notice of appeal and sole ground raised only the forfeiture question — nothing challenging the actual basis on which the Court of Appeal had dismissed the cross-appeal in the first place, which was that it considered itself bound by the earlier related decision.

Resolution of the Question for Determination

On whether a ground of appeal has to actually connect to what the lower court decided, the Court held that an appeal must arise from an actual decision of the court below — a ground of appeal, and any issue built on it, that has nothing to do with that decision is incompetent and liable to be struck out. Where a lower court dismisses an appeal without ever getting to the substantive issues, those substantive issues cannot simply be resurrected on a further appeal as though the lower court had ruled on them.

Applying that here, the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the Federal Government's cross-appeal rested entirely on one basis: that it considered itself bound by its own earlier decision in the co-accused's related appeal. The Federal Government's notice of appeal to the Supreme Court never challenged that basis at all — it raised no ground complaining that the Court of Appeal was wrong to consider itself bound, and no ground addressing the reasons for, or findings behind, that dismissal. Instead, the sole ground and issue went straight to the merits of the forfeiture question, as though the Court of Appeal had actually ruled on it. Since there was no Court of Appeal decision on that specific point to appeal from, the ground and the issue built on it were incompetent and were struck out.

On what happens to a part of a trial court's judgment nobody appeals, the Court held that any part of a judgment left unchallenged by any ground of appeal remains unappealed — and is treated as accepted by the parties as correct, conclusive, and binding on them. Here, the Federal Government had never appealed the trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing the respondent to fifteen years rather than the maximum available term. Having accepted that exercise of discretion as valid, the Federal Government couldn't then turn around and argue, in the same breath, that the underlying statute prescribed a mandatory sentence the court had no discretion to depart from at all — the two positions couldn't coexist.

On what it actually takes to order forfeiture of a vessel under the Miscellaneous Offences Act, the Court read section 1(17) closely. The provision makes clear that a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other conveyance can only be forfeited to the Federal Government where it was actually used in the unlawful dealing the section targets — importing, exporting, selling, offering for sale, distributing, or otherwise dealing in crude oil or petroleum product without lawful authority. That use isn't a formality; it's a condition. There has to be actual evidence, and a specific factual finding, that the vessel was genuinely used for that unlawful purpose before an order of forfeiture can properly follow.

Here, the trial court had found — and the Court of Appeal affirmed — that the prosecution never proved any petroleum product from Nigeria was actually found aboard Akshay, which is exactly why the respondent was acquitted on the substantive dealing charge. Once that finding stood, it was clear the vessel had never been used to commit any of the offences the statute describes. Without that use, there was no legal basis to add forfeiture on top of the custodial sentence — and the failure to order it violated nothing.

On what an appellant actually has to show to succeed, the Court reiterated a foundational principle: it falls to every appellant to establish the specific error in the decision being appealed — an extension of the broader rule that whoever asserts a fact has to prove it to be entitled to judgment on that assertion. A judgment is treated as sound and properly reached until someone actually demonstrates otherwise, and it's the appellant who carries that job. Simply pointing to a mistake isn't the finish line either — the appellant has to take the further step of showing what real unfairness that mistake actually produced. None of that legwork is something a court will do in the appellant's place — it isn't the bench's role to hunt down the winning argument or the supporting authority counsel neglected to bring.

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the sole ground of appeal was incompetent for failing to challenge the actual basis of the Court of Appeal's decision, and that in any event, the vessel Akshay had never been shown to have been used in committing the offence, leaving no lawful basis for an order of forfeiture.

Key Takeaways

  • A ground of appeal has to actually target what the lower court decided. Where a court dismisses a case on one specific basis, an appeal that ignores that basis and argues the underlying merits instead is incompetent.
  • Accepting part of a judgment by not appealing it can box you in elsewhere. You can't leave a trial court's exercise of sentencing discretion unchallenged and then argue, on appeal, that the same statute left no room for discretion at all.
  • Forfeiture of a vehicle or vessel under the Miscellaneous Offences Act requires actual proof it was used to commit the offence — it isn't an automatic add-on to a related conviction.
  • An appellant carries a real, active burden: identifying an error isn't enough on its own. The appellant must also show the injustice that error actually caused, and courts won't build that case on the appellant's behalf.

In Practice

Before filing a cross-appeal against a decision that itself rests on procedural grounds — being bound by an earlier ruling, a limitation issue, a threshold finding — it is worth confirming that the notice of appeal actually engages with that specific reasoning, rather than leaping straight to the substantive point a client cares about. This case is a clean illustration of how an otherwise legitimate grievance can be filtered out entirely at the competence stage, before a court ever reaches the merits a party actually wants decided.

Related Reading

This case fits naturally alongside other posts on this blog dealing with what makes a ground of appeal competent, and how far an appellant's burden actually extends:

This post is based on the reported judgment of the Supreme Court of Nigeria and is intended for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice.

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