A Missing Name and a Missed Deadline: Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ibrahim Gidado & Ors. [2026] 13 NWLR (Pt. 2056) 55 — Supreme Court of Nigeria

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How does the Supreme court resolves several of its own conflicting decisions? What constitute a valid application for extension of time on appeal? Answers to these questions were proffered by the Supreme court in this case where an application before the Supreme Court was filed by the Federal Republic of Nigeria (through the EFCC), seeking extension of time and leave to appeal against a Court of Appeal ruling, after a chain of missed procedural deadlines. Along the way, the Court also settled a genuinely important constitutional question that had been left murky by its own prior decisions: does the Supreme Court still have jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal on grounds of fact or mixed law and fact, after a constitutional amendment deleted the specific provision that used to say so? The Supreme Court, unanimously, dismissed the application.

Facts of the Case

Ibrahim Gidado and three others were charged with six counts of money laundering before the Federal High Court, Sokoto. At the close of the prosecution's evidence, they made a no-case submission. On 11 October 2023, the trial court upheld that submission in respect of counts 1 to 5, discharging and acquitting all four respondents on those counts — but found the 1st respondent (Gidado) had a case to answer on count 6, and ordered him to enter his defence on that count alone.

Dissatisfied, the applicant (the FRN/EFCC) appealed to the Court of Appeal — but the notice of appeal it filed didn't include Gidado's name at all. Realizing the mistake later, the applicant sought to amend the notice to add him, along with a cluster of related reliefs: extension of time to seek leave to appeal against the ruling as it concerned Gidado, leave to appeal, extension of time to appeal, leave to compile a supplementary record with his name included, and an order deeming the amended documents properly filed.

Summary of Proceedings at the Court of Appeal

On 28 March 2025, the Court of Appeal granted only one of these requests — an extension of time to file the appellant's brief. On everything else, it found the applicant had failed to explain the delay in filing its notice of appeal against the ruling concerning Gidado, or the delay in applying for leave within the prescribed period. Since Supreme Court Rules require both a good reason for the delay and grounds of appeal that show good cause for the appeal to be heard, and the applicant had only shown one of the two, the Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal or any of the other reliefs sought.

Still dissatisfied, the applicant went back to the Court of Appeal on 22 April 2025 seeking leave to appeal further, to the Supreme Court. That application was heard on 20 May 2025 — and the Court of Appeal simply ordered it withdrawn, because the statutory time within which it could even hear and determine such an application had already expired.

The Application Before the Supreme Court

On 17 June 2025, the applicant went directly to the Supreme Court, seeking an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, leave to appeal itself, and an extension of time to actually appeal against the Court of Appeal's ruling. Its stated reason for the delay was that the Court of Appeal simply hadn't heard its leave application within the time the Supreme Court Act allows.

For the applicant, the position was straightforward: the delay wasn't really its own fault — it had done what it needed to do, and the Court of Appeal's failure to hear the matter in time was what pushed things past the statutory deadline.

For the respondents, led by senior counsel, the argument went further than just opposing the extension. They argued the Supreme Court no longer even had jurisdiction to hear appeals on grounds of fact or mixed law and fact at all, pointing to a 2010 constitutional amendment that deleted subsection 233(3) of the Constitution — the subsection that used to expressly deal with such appeals — and to the Court's own earlier decision in Shittu v. P.A.N. Ltd. and a more recent decision in Eribenne v. Ugoh, both of which had suggested that deletion removed the Court's power to hear such appeals.

How the Supreme Court Reasoned Through It

Does the Supreme Court Still Have Jurisdiction Over Fact-Based Appeals?

This was, in many ways, the more consequential question in the whole ruling, even though it arose inside what was technically just an interlocutory application. The Court worked through it methodically.

Section 233(1) of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal, full stop — without limiting the type of appeal. The Court applied a basic principle of statutory interpretation: where a provision uses a word or phrase generally, without any limiting language, it should be read to apply generally, unless something else in the statute suggests otherwise. Since "appeals from the Court of Appeal" carries no qualifying words, it covers all such appeals — not just some categories.

Section 233(2) then lists specific appeals that lie as of right. The Court held this doesn't shrink the broader jurisdiction in subsection (1) — it simply means that appeals not on that list require leave of court rather than being automatic. And critically, the power to grant that leave doesn't need to be separately and expressly written into the Constitution at all: it's inherent in the jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals in the first place. A court empowered to hear appeals inherently has the power to grant leave to bring one, whether or not a specific provision spells that out.

As for the 2010 deletion of subsection 233(3), the Court held this hadn't removed anything, because there was nothing in the remaining constitutional text that expressly ousted the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over fact-based or mixed-law-and-fact appeals. The general principle is that courts presume they retain jurisdiction unless a law unambiguously says otherwise — removing a subsection from the text doesn't, on its own, tell a court that its power over a whole category of appeals has quietly vanished. The deleted subsection had, at most, restated what already followed from the rest of section 233; removing that restatement didn't remove the underlying jurisdiction itself.

Sorting Out the Court's Own Conflicting Precedents

The respondents' strongest card was the Court's own prior language in Shittu v. P.A.N. Ltd., which had appeared to say the opposite. The Court dealt with this by classifying that language as obiter dictum — an observation made in passing that wasn't actually the reason for the decision in that case, and therefore not binding. It contrasted this with a later decision, Amadi v. Wopara, which had directly addressed and clarified the point: the Supreme Court remains empowered to hear appeals on grounds other than pure law, provided the appellant first obtains leave.

The Court also confirmed that, since its decision in an earlier case called Eribenne v. Ugoh, it had continued in numerous subsequent cases to grant leave for, and hear, exactly this kind of appeal — creating a body of later precedent that effectively overrode Eribenne. Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, where two or more of the Court's own decisions conflict on a point, the later decision prevails and represents the current law. On that basis, appeals from the Court of Appeal on grounds of fact or mixed law and fact remain fully available, with leave.

Why the Application Still Failed Anyway

Having settled the jurisdictional question in the applicant's favour, the Court turned to whether the specific application actually met the requirements for an extension of time. Under the Supreme Court Rules, an applicant must show both good and substantial reasons for missing the deadline and that the proposed grounds of appeal show good cause why the appeal should be heard. Both conditions must be satisfied together — meeting only one isn't enough.

The Court found the applicant fell short on the first requirement, and the reasoning is instructive. The applicant's own timeline undercut its excuse: it had filed its application at the Court of Appeal only six days before the 30-day statutory deadline for appealing was due to expire, without explaining why it waited 25 of those 30 days before acting at all. It made no attempt to explain what efforts it made to get the application heard in the remaining days, or during the further 15-day extension period the law separately allows. And it offered no explanation for why it then waited a further two months, after the Court of Appeal ordered the earlier application withdrawn, before finally approaching the Supreme Court.

In short, much of the delay the applicant was pointing to as an excuse was a delay of its own making. As one of the concurring justices put it, the applicant was, in effect, trying to have it both ways — blaming the system for a problem that traced back to its own lack of urgency.

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the application for lack of merit. In doing so, it confirmed — as a matter of law that will apply well beyond this case — that the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal on grounds of fact or mixed law and fact, with leave, notwithstanding the 2010 deletion of subsection 233(3) of the Constitution.

Key Takeaways

  • Deleting a constitutional subsection doesn't automatically remove a jurisdiction it once restated. Courts require an unambiguous ouster of jurisdiction — they won't infer one from a deletion alone.
  • The Supreme Court still hears fact-based and mixed-law-and-fact appeals from the Court of Appeal — but only with leave. This ruling settles a genuinely unclear point left open by earlier, conflicting Supreme Court decisions.
  • Where the Supreme Court's own precedents conflict, the later decision governs. This is a useful example of how the Court itself resolves internal inconsistency in its case law over time.
  • An extension of time requires two things together, not one. A good reason for the delay, and grounds of appeal that show good cause — missing either one sinks the application.
  • A deadline missed partly through your own inaction is a hard one to excuse later. Waiting until close to a deadline, then blaming the system for what follows, rarely persuades a court.

This post is for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

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